A Rappler investigation discovered three properties estimated to be worth $6.10 million (P338 million)* owned by individuals with close links to Quiboloy and the KOJC. Two of these are in Canada, while one is located in an affluent part of Los Angeles in California, near the homes of several celebrities.

The details are based on official documents obtained by Rappler on Monday, March 11, as well as information from sources privy to KOJC operations.

The discoveries came after former president Rodrigo Duterte was appointed caretaker of the properties belonging to the Quiboloy-led group. Besides the North American properties, there are also several landholdings in the Philippines, as well as an air fleet.

Quiboloy, as described by his mentor, Reverend Gordon Mallory of the United Pentecostal Church, “went from a pauper, a beggar, to a multi-billionaire,” with a “lifestyle of the rich and famous.”

“Money means nothing to him,” Mallory said.

Quiboloy has been in the US Federal Bureau of Investigation’s most-wanted list since early 2022, for sex trafficking of children and promotional money laundering, among others. An FBI poster says the preacher is also wanted for forcing members to “solicit donations for a bogus charity, donations that actually were used to finance church operations and the lavish lifestyle of its leaders.”

A Senate committee has cited him in contempt and has sought his arrest so he could testify before the panel which is looking into similar allegations of abuse and exploitation hurled by his former followers.

Quiboloy’s mansions

In a video posted on The Pentecostals of Cebu City Facebook page on January 30, Mallory said Quiboloy owns mansions and estates “all over the world,” confirming the one in California.

Mallory recalled being invited and brought to the California mansion with his wife, and seeing Quiboloy’s vehicles in the garage, which included a “brand new Bentley and a Mercedes.” He said the Filipino preacher also gave him a box that contained cash more than what his family needed to last six months.

“Justin Bieber has a house across the street; the Kardashians have a house down the street; Will Smith lives around the corner,” said Mallory who recalled the time he was invited to Quiboloy’s mansion.

The mansion stands on Simpson Place, a quiet residential neighborhood located in Calabasas, California. Known for its upscale homes, lush landscaping, and privacy afforded its residents, the area offers easy access to amenities and outdoor activities.

Calabasas, located in Los Angeles County, is known for its affluent neighborhoods and celebrity residents. Nestled in the hills west of the San Fernando Valley, it offers a mix of luxury homes, gated communities, and scenic hiking trails. The city also boasts of upscale shopping centers.

The six-bedroom Calabasas property is valued at US$2.573 million (P142.80 million), based on 2023 tax records seen by Rappler. Its land value was estimated to amount to US$1.19 million (P65.91 million) while improvements done to the property were pegged at US$1.39 million (P76.93 million). The owners paid a total of $29,409.94 (P1.63 million) in property taxes for the fiscal year 2023-2024. 

Sold to associates?

The property was built in 1993 but was first bought by the KOJC in 2011 for US$2.1 million (P116.55 million), according to information obtained by Rappler. Since then, its ownership has been transferred four times among three entities – the KOJC, Helen Panilag, and Guia Cabactulan. 

The last documented transaction was in 2018 when Cabactulan appeared to have bought the property from the church for an undisclosed price.

Panilag and Cabactulan are, however, known church associates of Quiboloy, and were among those indicted along with the preacher, by a federal grand jury in a California district court in late 2021. 

Panilag is included in the US Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) most wanted list, alongside Quiboloy. She has been tagged by the FBI as “the alleged one-time church administrator in the [US] who oversaw the collection of financial data from church operations around the globe.” She has also been wanted for her alleged “participation in a labor trafficking scheme that brought church members” to the US, including fraudulently obtaining visas and forcing members to solicit donations.

Cabactulan, meanwhile, has been described as “the top KOJC official in the United States who maintained direct communication with KOJC leadership in the Philippines.” She was arrested in January 2020 in the US for immigration fraud.

Another KOJC member included in the FBI’s wanted list – Teresita Dandan – was registered as a resident of the Calabasas property since May 2012. Dandan, according to the FBI, served as the alleged “international administrator,” and one of the top overseers of the church and its alleged bogus charity operations in the US. 

Former KOJC workers, who turned against Quiboloy, said the preacher bought the mansion in 2011 and sold it sometime in October 2018, months after authorities held his private plane, where they found a suitcase containing US$350,000 (P19.4 million) in undeclared cash and assorted gun parts, in Hawaii. As it turns out, the buyer in 2018 is also a member of the KOJC.

“I’ve been to that mansion,” Arlene Caminong-Stone, a former KOJC worker based in Minnesota, told Rappler on Sunday, March 11. Stone was one of those who testified online against Quiboloy at the start of the Senate panel hearings in January, narrating details about the alleged abuses by the preacher and providing insights into the inner workings of the KOJC.

Surrey property

According to former KOJC workers, Quiboloy also bought mansions in Canada. One is an over P99-million house in Surrey, and another on Latania Boulevard in Brampton City in Ontario’s Greater Toronto Area.

The seven-bedroom property in Surrey, British Columbia, Canada is about half an hour away from Vancouver. It was first built in 2003, and is just a 15-minute drive from a KOJC church on 13055 Old Yale Road, also in Surrey. 

Based on tax records seen by Rappler, the Surrey property was assessed to be worth CAD$2.42 million (US$1.79 million/P99.5 million) in 2023. Its land value was estimated to be worth CAD$1.68 million (US$1.25 million/P69 million) and improvements done on the property cost CAD$734,000 (US$544,197/P30.17 million). 

The owners paid CAD$7,297.54 (US$5,410/P300,000) in gross taxes for 2023. 

A document obtained by Rappler from the Land Title and Survey Authority of British Columbia shows that the property is owned by another known Quiboloy associate, Mariteo Canada. Her name was cited in an article posted on Quiboloy’s website. She was also tagged as part of Quiboloy’s delegation in an event with the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples in 2022.

Ontario property

The four-bedroom property in Brampton, Ontario is situated along Latania Boulevard, a half-hour car ride to Toronto. Houses in the area are priced not less than CAD$1 million each, according to real estate websites. 

The alleged Quiboloy-linked property was first listed as being for sale in April 2010 for CAD$699,000 (US$518,243/P27.73 million) and was sold the same year for CAD$658,000 (US$487,826/P27 million). 

The property was last listed as being available in September 2020 for CAD$1.45 million (US$1.74 million/P96.25 million) but with no indication whether it was successfully sold. Taxes paid were estimated to be CAD$7,721 (US$5,723/P317,249). 

According to a property document obtained by Rappler, one of the two listed owners is linked to the KOJC. Her profile on LinkedIn showed that she is an “administrative assistant” of the church. A cursory search of other names included in the document also showed connections to Quiboloy’s group.

The property is half an hour’s drive from the nearest KOJC headquarters.

Notable Davao properties

Quiboloy’s group has been open about many of their properties, especially those in the Philippines.

Among the notable properties owned by the group are well-manicured estates in the village of Tamayong in Calinan District in Davao. Tamayong serves as the KOJC’s headquarters and is where the preacher built his mansion, near the group’s so-called Prayer Mountain.

Aside from the approximately eight-hectare Prayer Mountain, Quiboloy’s group also owns what they refer to as Glory Mountain, roughly a 21-hectare property, in the same village.

According to KOJC workers, Quiboloy has landholdings in Samal Island city, and at Purok 8, Barangay San Miguel in Indangan Buhangin, Davao City, where the preacher set up the main headquarters of the allegedly bogus charity group, the Children’s Joy Foundation.

Quiboloy’s group also owns the Jose Maria College (JMC), and an unfinished multi-billion-peso mixed-use indoor arena, touted to dwarf the close to P9-billion Iglesia ni Cristo Philippine Arena in Bulacan. Located near Davao’s Francisco Bangoy International Airport, the King Dome, according to a November 2019 Sunstar report, was envisioned to be the biggest indoor arena “with a seating capacity of 70,000, bigger than the Philippine Arena, which is currently the world’s largest indoor arena with a maximum seating capacity of 55,000.”

Aircraft fleet

ApolloAir, a Davao-based airline owned by Quiboloy, maintains an aircraft fleet that includes Bell 429 and 505 light helicopters, a Robinson R44 four-seat light helicopter, and two planes.

Senator Robinhood Padilla told reporters on Thursday, March 7, that Quiboloy lent him one of his helicopters when he campaigned for a Senate seat in 2022.

One plane, a US$18-million (P999 million) Cessna Citation Sovereign+, was bought in 2014 and was sold back to Cessna for US$9 million (P499.5 million) after the 2018 Hawaii incident. Another is a Gulfstream IIB transcontinental twin turbofan-powered aircraft, which was decommissioned in 2010 because it was no longer airworthy.

Generous friend

Quiboloy has been very generous toward his friends, especially Duterte, his new property administrator, with whom he forged a friendship dating back to the years preceding the latter’s presidency.

In 2016, Duterte openly acknowledged being gifted by Quiboloy with three properties in Woodridge Park in Ma-a, along with an additional lot in Royal Pines located in Matina, Davao City. Aside from real estate holdings, Duterte disclosed that Quiboloy had also gifted him with a Nissan Safari and Ford Expedition several years prior.

Duterte said Quiboloy was so generous that whenever the preacher made a purchase, he would buy two so he could give him the other one.

He also recalled that Quiboloy had even offered to cover the expenses for the then-mayor’s consultation with a known American neurosurgeon, Dr. Martin Cooper, after the preacher learned about his sweaty palms.

Preacher’s roots

Quiboloy has humble beginnings, starting as a 19-year-old Pentecostal convert in the late 1960s, recalled Reverend Mallory who claimed to have mentored the then-young preacher long before he started building his religious empire.

“We took him out of a hut…. He and his family used to beg for food…. His teeth were rotten and we took him to a dentist,” the aging Mallory, preaching, told his congregation.

The American preacher said Quiboloy lived with him for eight years, and they sent him to a Bible school where he excelled. Years later, Quiboloy declared himself the “appointed son of God,” and has repeatedly claimed that without him, there will be no eternal salvation.

“He developed into a wonderful preacher and became our national youth president…. But somewhere along the line, he tripped up, left our organization, formed his own, and became something he really isn’t, but he really started to lift himself up…. He turned his back on the apostolic truth,” Mallory said.

Quiboloy traces his roots to the ultraconservative Oneness Pentecostal movement that began in the early 20th century, particularly in the US. It emphasizes a monotheistic view of God, departing from the conventional doctrine of the Trinity. 

Oneness Pentecostals maintain their belief in a singular divine being who reveals himself in three manifestations, as opposed to the orthodox Christian concept of the Trinity consisting of three distinct persons. 

Quiboloy has admitted to going into hiding even before Philippine authorities could issue an arrest order, citing purported threats of assassination. – Rappler.com

*$1 = P55.5

If you have tips about properties linked to Apollo Quiboloy and the KOJC or any other helpful information, you may share them with us via email: investigative@rappler.com.

REPUBLISHED MAR 11, 2024 3:38 PM PHT
FIRST PUBLISHED MAR 1, 2024 2:30 PM PHT
BY Lian Buan, Jairo Bolledo, Jodesz Gavilan
All illustrations by Alejandro Edoria

There are already 654 guns in the combined vault of only five members of the powerful and ruling Duterte clan, made up of mostly the handy and easy-to-use pistols and a hundred rifles, documents obtained by Rappler show. (Editor’s Note: In an earlier version of this story, we counted 477, to include only four members of the Duterte family. New information gathered allowed us to update our count.)

The patriarch, former president Rodrigo Duterte, has the most number of firearms in his collection, or 363 assorted weapons, which is five more than we earlier reported which was at the time based on records from October 2023. After our reporting, we obtained the most recent records.

His eldest, Davao City 1st District Representative Paolo Duterte has about half the size of his father’s vault, or 172 newly-licensed firearms. His youngest son, Davao City Mayor Sebastian Duterte has 61, his son-in-law Manases Carpio has 30, and his daughter, Carpio’s wife, Vice President and Education Secretary Sara Duterte, has 28. We were unable to verify if other members of the family, including the former president’s partner and children in-law, have any firearms.

These documents are in the records of the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Office (PNP-FEO), and were verified to be authentic by Rappler. These documents mean that the firearms in these records were licensed.

Former president Duterte passed a law on May 6, 2022 that extended the validity of a firearm to 10 years, when before a license was valid for only four years before it had to be renewed again. The former president benefitted from his own law because his 358 firearms were renewed afterwards, just weeks before he stepped down as president, and obtained 10-year licenses.

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Duterte got licenses for over 300 guns 2 weeks before his term ended

The new law he passed, RA 11766, also made it easier for him to obtain a permit to carry outside residence. Part of the amendments made to the old version, RA 10591, listed professions such as lawyers, businessmen, journalists, accountants, as having an assumed threat to their safety and thereby giving them an easier time applying for a permit. In the new law, Duterte added two: an elected official, both former and current such as himself, and retired and active law enforcement personnel.

His children also benefitted from this law because Sara and Sebastian are elected officials too: Sara was Davao City mayor before the 2022 elections, and Sebastian was Davao City vice mayor at the time.

In Sebastian’s vault of 66, there are 24 firearms with 10-year licenses or until 2033 or 2034. Paolo also has 24 firearms with 10-year licenses, because most of the firearms in his vault of 144 are expiring either this year, 2025, or 2026 – which means he can renew them by then and get a fresh 10-year license if he wishes. Sara has six firearms with 10-year licenses, and husband Manases has seven firearms with 10-year licenses expiring in the same period.

The most expensive guns in the vault, according to publicly available market pricing, are the pistols. Paolo’s Wilson Combat EDC X9S is worth P342,500, and Sebastian’s Les Baer 572 Hemi pistol is worth P300,000. The Kriss Vector SDP Gen II, one of which Rodrigo and Sebastian each own, is priced at P261,000.

Why so many?

The Philippines has an enduring problem of gun violence, notoriously committed by the private armies of powerful clans. Past attempts at cracking down, and abolishing the private armies have failed because of watered down legislations, such as not putting a ceiling on the number of guns an individual can own. 

The law says an individual possessing at least 15 guns is already a gun collector, and can obtain a Type 5 license, provided she or he passes the required drug and psychological tests, plus a vault inspection.

Although the law does not impose a limit on the number of guns per person, the common gun collector follows regulations as guidance and usually keeps his or her collection to around 15, according to our industry sources. The more avid shooter can have more – for example, former tax commissioner and known gun enthusiast Kim Henares has 40.

Henares believes the law is right not to impose a limit on the number of guns one person can possess, but the former Cabinet member – and the late former president Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III’s shooting buddy – said the regulators must be strict in the psychological test. Under FEO guidelines, the neuro-psychiatric examination and the drug test should be done by the PNP Health Service and the crime laboratory group, respectively.

“What you should regulate is making sure who holds those guns, right? Even if you allow one person to only have one gun, if he’s unstable, it’s the same thing,” said Henares in a mix of English and Filipino.

The Dutertes did not respond to Rappler’s requests for an interview or statement for this story. Separate requests were sent to the offices of Sara, Paolo, Sebastian, and Manases Carpio. We will update this story once they respond.

Rodrigo and Sara indirectly reacted to Rappler’s stories in separate statements. On March 7, the Vice President posted a video statement, saying the reporting about her guns is part of an “organized demolition job.” She said these allegations aim to tarnish her integrity and create an image that she is a “killer, corrupt, abusive, and a warlord.” 

“Makikita natin ito sa pag-atake sa confidential funds, pagpapalaganap ng video sa Commonwealth traffic, paggawa ng issue sa pagtatag ng security para sa Opisina ng Bise Presidente, paglabas ng testigo na umano’y ako ay kaparte ng Davao Death Squad, sa malisyosong ulat tungkol sa aking mga baril, at ang pambabastos sa relasyon namin ng aking asawa,” the Vice President said. 

(We can see this through the attack against confidential funds, the viral Commonwealth traffic video, making an issue of the creation of a security unit for the Office of the Vice President, a witness claiming that I am part of the Davao Death Squad, through a malicious report about my guns, and the disrespect for my relationship with my husband.)

On January 30 during a press conference in Davao City, Duterte took a swipe at Rappler’s earlier reporting on his gun collection and said that many of his guns were gifts when he was president, and that all of them are licensed anyway. According to Duterte, he knew that there were inquiries about his gun collection because a cop had tipped him off.  

“Kinakalkal ‘yung firearms namin kung magkano, naririnig ko eh, tumawag ‘yung FEO…Lahat ng baril ko, pati maliit na baril, lisensiyado ‘yan. Kasi mahilig ako sa baril, pina-rehistro ko lahat sa Crame. Eh sila nagtanung-tanong, marami kang baril, eh putang-ina tanong mo sa Crame, regalo ‘yan,” said Duterte.

(They were looking into our firearms, how much they were, I heard because someone from the FEO called me…. All of my guns, even my small guns, are licensed. I am into guns, so I registered them all in Crame. But they were asking – you have so many guns, son of a bitch ask Crame, they are gifts.)

Why do we have Class-A light weapons?

The PNP-FEO told Rappler in December 2023 that the rules are uniform for everyone and that a former president such as Duterte does not enjoy special privileges. 

However, records bear out that each member of the Duterte clan owns Class-A light weapons, which under RA 10591 can be bought, owned, and licensed only by law enforcement personnel.

Class-A light weapons, under the law, include self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, submachine guns, assault rifles, and light machine guns not exceeding caliber 7.62 mm which have a fully automatic mode. Their FEO records explicitly say that Rodrigo Duterre has 38 Class-A light weapons, Paolo Duterte has 24, Sara Duterte has 3, Sebastian Duterte has 1, and Manases Carpio has 1. 

How are they able to license Class-A light weapons, which should have been exclusive to the military, police, and other law enforcement agencies?

It could be because the law’s exception clause applied to them. Because RA 10591 was passed only in 2013, non-law enforcement individuals (like the Dutertes) who possessed Class-A light weapons before 2013 were allowed to continue ownership of such firearms and were only required to renew their licenses. We sought clarification from the FEO on February 20 and followed up on February 28, and again on March 5, but have not yet received a response as of March 11. We will update this story once we do.

We also asked on March 8 whether the PNP will retroactively apply its recently amended internal rules to include more types of firearms in the small arms group, but we got no clear response. 

Based on estimates from market retail prices, the Duterte family’s weaponry is worth a total of P24 million. Former president Duterte’s collection is worth around P5.5 million, but his sons’ vaults, although much smaller collections, have more expensive firearms. 

Paolo’s collection of 172 is worth P10.2 million – more expensive than his father’s P5.5 million – based on newer documents we obtained. Based on last year’s documents, Sebastian’s collection is worth P5.4 million, Manases Carpio’s collection is worth around P2 million, and Vice President Sara Duterte’s collection is worth around P1.04 million.

Duterte and his guns

When speculations spread that an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court (ICC) was forthcoming, the former president said he would resist arrest and he threatened violence.

“Kapag puntahan nila ako, arestuhin nila ako dito, magkabarilan talaga ‘yan at uubusin ko ang mga putanginang ‘yan (If they come for me, if they arrest me here, there will be a shootout, I will finish all those sons of bitches),” said Duterte.

The ICC is investigating the six years of Duterte’s bloody drug war, and six years of his term as mayor and vice mayor of Davao City for the killings made by the alleged Davao Death Squad.

While the Philippine government still maintains that The Hague has lost jurisdiction over the Philippine case after Duterte withdrew membership from the Court, Prosecutor Karim Khan has successfully appealed to the ICC chamber to let him continue his investigation. The probe has reached a stage where Khan can request for summons or a warrant.

Duterte has also started pushing for a rehashed idea of a Mindanao secession, which he mentioned in a nasty public word war with President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. in January. Opposition leader and former senator Antonio Trillanes IV, Duterte’s staunch enemy, said the PNP must cancel his gun licenses if he is threatening to secede. 

“Ito ay nag-incite to sedition/secession na. Malamang na gagamitin pa ang mga baril na ‘yan laban sa gobyerno (He is already inciting to sedition/secession. It’s possible he will use those firearms against the government),” Trillanes said.

A witness against Duterte’s friend and spiritual adviser, the controversial doomsday preacher Apollo Quiboloy, said he had once witnessed Duterte and Vice President Sara Duterte leave the preacher’s compound with bags of guns. The witness said this during a Senate investigation into the violations of Quiboloy and his religious group Kingdom of Jesus Christ (KOJC) which had been accused of sexual assault.

“Minsan po pumupunta doon si former president Rodrigo Duterte at former Davao mayor Sara Duterte. ‘Pag umalis na po sila sa Glory Mountain, dala na po nila ang mga bag na siya pong mga bag na nilalagyan po ng mga baril,” said the witness during a Senate hearing on February 19. (Sometimes former president Rodrigo Duterte and former Davao mayor Sara Duterte would visit. When they leave the Glory Mountain, they would carry with them bags of guns.)

Sara Duterte responded to this accusation by imputing political motivations. “Sa kasaysayan ng Pilipinas, naging kagawian na ang pag-atake at pagbato ng sari-saring isyu laban sa Bise Presidente. Marahil, sapagkat ang Bise Presidente ang tumatayong pangunahing hadlang sa mga nangangarap maging pangulo,” she said on February 21.

(In the history of the Philippines, it’s been a tradition to attack and throw issues against the vice president. Perhaps, because the Vice President is the primary obstacle to those who aspire to be president.) 

Former president Duterte denied that Quiboloy gave him guns, telling journalists in Davao City on February 27 that: “Kami magtanggap ng baril kay Quiboloy? It is a very stupid proposition. Bakit naman si Pastor Quiboloy magbigay sa akin ng baril? Saan siya kukuha?” (We will get guns from Quiboloy? It is a very stupid proposition. Why would Pastor Quiboloy give me guns, where will he get them?)

– with a report from Ferdinand Zuasola/Rappler.com

The situation was exacerbated during the pandemic, when the government imposed restrictions and prohibited cars and public utility vehicles from plying the roads.

Because of this, many people have turned to biking as an alternative mode of transport. In response, local governments across the country created pop-up bike lanes. The Department of Transportation (DOTr) even opened the 313-kilometer bike lane network in Metro Manila in 2021. 

But just how friendly are Metro Manila’s roads for bike commuters? 

To find out how bike-friendly Metro Manila is, Rappler rode a loop of 120 kilometers around the capital in January for a documentary. Riding 100 kilometers or more is part of the bucket list of many bikers due to its sheer distance and the challenge it poses.

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The loop covered Pasig, Marikina, Quezon City, Valenzuela, Malabon, Caloocan, Manila, Pasay, Parañaque, Las Piñas, Muntinlupa, and Taguig.

The loop went through 21 major roads:

The East Service Road was split into two in the reviews, owing to the completely different conditions of the section from Muntinlupa to Bicutan beside the South Luzon Expressway, and the section from Bicutan Circle to C-5 in Taguig. In the former, there was no bike lane and the road was two-way, making it hard to overtake. The bike lane began northbound after Bicutan Circle.

This brought the total number of assessed road segments to 22.

The accumulated mileage of all roads assessed was 84 kilometers. The rest of the 120-kilometer loop involved inner and connecting roads. 

How we graded bike-friendliness

To assess bike-friendliness, Rappler drew up criteria evaluating the bike lanes using four factors: lane width, road conditions, obstructions, and segregation. 

These are factors that affect a biker’s safety on the road, also take into account the infrastructure the government put in place, and gauge the attitude of other motorists with respect to the lane and the bike commuter.

Only portions of the major roads covered in the loop were measured in the scorecard. 

Lane width was evaluated using the Department of Public Works and Highways’ (DPWH) guidelines. Under Department Order (DO) No. 88 series of 2020, the DPWH prescribes a minimum of 1.22 meters to make way for a one-directional bike lane. The standard should measure 2.44 meters for a bidirectional bike lane. 

Sections without bike lanes were graded an automatic zero. 

Lane widths in Valenzuela and Malabon along Manila North Road differed slightly and were measured separately.

To assess road conditions, Rappler counted the number of manhole covers, potholes, steel plates, and drain grates. 

On sections without bike lanes, manhole covers, potholes, steel plates, and drain grates placed on the rightmost side of the road, or where a bike commuter would most probably pass, were counted.

For obstructions, moving and parked vehicles, pipe laying works, and vendors encroaching on the bike lanes were also counted. 

On sections without bike lanes, parked vehicles, pipe laying works, and vendors on the rightmost side of the road or where a bike commuter would most probably pass were likewise counted.

Rappler did not count moving vehicles sideswiping as there were no lanes whatsoever to count as encroachment. 

We graded segregation based on infrastructure used: dashed painted lines, solid painted lines, solid painted lines with occasional barriers, and solid painted lines with barriers. 

A completely segregated bikeway, as seen only along C-6, got a perfect score. 

We rode the same route another time in February to measure lane widths and assess road conditions. Obstructions were counted from the footage taken by the camera installed on the bike on the day the documentary was filmed in January.

What we found

Ten out of the 22 segments rated poorly – this is 45% of the segments evaluated.

Bike-friendliness of a segment or city does not only rely on infrastructure, but also on quality, maintenance, and people’s attitudes toward active modes of transport.

C-6, which got an excellent score in segregation, failed when it came to obstructions because its wide bike lanes, at 2.95 meters, were predominantly used as parking spaces.

East Avenue in Quezon City was the only bike lane with sections of concrete barriers in the whole loop. It was 1 out of 4 segments that scored the highest under segregation, with a score of 3.

But East Avenue got an average score on obstructions for the same reason, as some of the concrete barriers were already broken – becoming another hazard that bike commuters have to be wary of.

Rizal Avenue, which traverses Caloocan and Manila, scored zero on all factors. The avenue connecting the north to the capital did not have bike lanes.

It had dismal road conditions and many obstructions, such as parked vehicles and several pipe laying works that would push the biker either toward the center or the left lane.

Roxas Boulevard, a major thoroughfare almost synonymous with Manila, got a failing mark. The Manila side of the boulevard did not have a bike lane despite being relatively wider than other roads in the city.

The bike lane along Roxas Boulevard started only from Pasay onwards. Along Parañaque, the lane was just a strip of solid white lines without a bicycle road marking.

Daang Reyna, despite not having any bike lanes at all, scored a 10 because of minimal roadblocks and obstructions. This could be attributed to the socioeconomic profile of the neighborhood, the wide space, and the less stressful environment because of the reduced volume of cars.

Bonifacio Global City (BGC) and C-6 segments scored the highest in the scorecard – but for different reasons.

BGC had better road conditions and little to no obstructions. But while C-6 had better conditions, the segment scored low on obstructions despite having the best segregation among all segments.

In a nutshell:

• Manila – represented by Rizal Avenue and its share of Roxas Boulevard – did not prioritize the establishment of bike lanes. Rizal Avenue got zero on all factors. It had no bike lanes, road conditions were dismal, and obstructions abounded.
• Las Piñas, via Diego Cera Avenue and Alabang-Zapote Road, may have wider lanes than most (both measuring 1.52 meters) but it failed to keep off obstructions. Road conditions were dismal.
• Taguig, via C-6, showed the best bike infrastructure. It was the road segment that got the highest score among others, getting a good rating. However, strict enforcement in C-6 was lacking as vehicles were parked on the segregated bike path.
• Quezon City was the only local government Rappler saw to have ongoing construction of bike infrastructure, while others’ bike infrastructure were slowly diminishing or hardly maintained. It was also the only local government to employ dedicated bike patrollers.
• Almost all of the bike lanes (95%) we passed in Metro Manila only had painted bike strips. Only 4 road segments had the occasional bollards or barriers.

While this report looked at width, conditions, obstructions, and segregation, the bike lane network in Metro Manila could be assessed further by connectivity, materials used on the lanes, and general maintenance.

Nighttime commuting by bike is also a different experience that could be evaluated separately.

Aside from the bike lane network, the quality of the commuting trip of a cyclist also depends on the availability of end-of-trip facilities like bike parking and shower areas in offices and establishments.

A separate road

Painted lanes with no bollards or other forms of barriers still open the bike lane to the encroachment of other vehicles. But this is the only infrastructure that a majority of bike lanes in Metro Manila can speak of.

So what should a bike lane network look like?

“If you want a network, you have to plan the bike lanes,” Jose Regin Regidor, director of the University of the Philippines Institute of Civil Engineering, told Rappler in an interview. “As if it’s a separate road.”

Regidor is one of the research fellows at the National Center for Transportation Studies who helped in formulating the Bike Lane Master Plan back in 2022. This was a joint effort between the DOTr and the United Nations Development Programme.

Even a master plan like this, said Regidor, should be reviewed regularly every three to five years.

Some of the existing popular guidelines for bike lane networks are the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO), the Netherlands’ CROW Design Manual for Bicycle Traffic (CROW), and the design guide from the National Association of City Transportation Officials (NACTO).

In the Netherlands, more than 25% of trips are done by riding a bike, according to a 2018 briefer by the Dutch research agency National Institute for Public Health and the Environment.

“The number of bicycles in the country outnumbers the amount of people,” the briefer read. “Cycling is part of our way of life.”

This has contributed to a decrease in air and noise pollution, decongestion of roads, increased physical activity among low-income and ethnic minority adults, and economic benefits for users and establishment owners. 

Gaps in design and mindset

In 2022, at the height of the pandemic cycling boom, the DOTr allotted P2 billion for cycling infrastructure in the country. The budget has since decreased in the following years, going down to P750 million in 2023 and P500 million in 2024.

In the same year, the DOTr opened its active transport office, which started as an ad hoc team.

Without any precedent to follow, the government largely based its bike infrastructure guidelines on NACTO since the Philippines’ road configuration is similar to that of the US.

Because of the novelty of Metro Manila’s bike infrastructure, there were design gaps in implementation.

An example would be the bike lane width. Under DO 88, the minimum width is 1.22 meters, but in the middle of implementation, the government had to revise guidelines to 1.5 meters after it became apparent that a 1.22-meter lane was too small, said Eldon Dionisio, project manager at the active transport office at DOTr.

Dionisio told Rappler that many local government units measured the bike lane from the outer rim of the pavement marking when they should have been measuring by operational width or the open space between two lanes.

Another gap in design is connectivity. Right now, there’s a push to remove bike lanes on national roads like EDSA. But Dionisio said this should not be the case.

“One main principle when you’re building a bike lane network is that it should be direct because cyclists use their own energy to move,” Dionisio said in a mix of Filipino and English. “You should provide them the most direct route.”

Beyond the gaps in design and infrastructure, the bigger struggle lies in entities that do not have active transport in their priorities. Dionisio called this a “misalignment of priorities.”

“We encounter, every now and then, apprehensions from different entities – may it be an individual, a group, an office, an agency – against building active transport infrastructure.”

Better public transport

For the longest time, Filipinos think in terms of using cars or commuting by public transport to go from one point to another.

Other modes of transport, like bikes, are seen as a cause of congestion rather than an additional mode of transport that people can use. A common argument against bike lanes is that they only contribute to more congestion of roads. But the conversation must go beyond car users and bikers, said Regidor.

“We’re always pitting the cars and the bikes when, in fact, the problem is public transport,” he said.

The professor said that there’s a natural synergy between good public transport and a working bike lane network.

In other countries in Europe, for example, commuters can take their bike with them on the train so that their bike commute trip is augmented by public transport.

For example, Regidor said that the current state of bike lanes along Marcos Highway could use some improvement, given that the highway is wide and there’s already a rail rapid transit line in the area. 

Currently, the bike lane along Marcos Highway is 1.14 meters wide. At its widest, the bike lane measured 2.2 meters. But the wide lane was painted on the sidewalk and ended abruptly because of a barrier at a right turn where vehicles turn to enter Marikina.

That Marcos Highway remains congested during rush hours means more people are still opting to use cars.

Are people really shifting from private cars to public transport? We need to determine why they don’t.

Jose Regin Regidor

Making headway

Most bike lanes sprang across Metro Manila during the pandemic, when healthcare professionals and frontliners had to use bikes or other modes of active transport to get around. The national government then came out with guidelines for the establishment of bike lanes.

As restrictions eased and people went back to normal, most local governments also neglected to maintain the bike lanes. Bollards were removed, and paint started to fade. But one local government did the opposite by continuing to establish better lanes.

Even before the DPWH released DO No. 88, Quezon City had already started augmenting its 55-kilometer bike lane network that already existed before the pandemic.

According to Alberto Kimpo, assistant city administrator for operations in Quezon City, they used the AASHTO and NACTO guidelines in establishing the city’s bike lanes during the pandemic.

They used an engineering undergraduate thesis written by a staff member, plotting the ideal routes of bike lanes within the city.

Many advocates say that with the right infrastructure, more people will turn to bike commuting to get around.

But this is a problem that local governments have to contend with. Kimpo said that they are still in the process of generating more bike users. In 2021, they counted 22,000 biking trips in a two-week period; in the following year, the number dropped to 19,000 biking trips.

Aside from generating users, there’s also the issue of making do with the limited space available.

“It is a movement, it is a utilization of space that we really need to push as of the moment and to get more users to benefit from it,” Kimpo said in a mix of Filipino and English in an interview with Rappler.

“The roadways are not designed for active mobility. There is also a constant push for road widening.”

Still, Quezon City is continuing efforts to make bike lanes amid the failure of other local governments to maintain the lanes they created during the pandemic. A master plan is on the way.

Currently, the city is endeavoring to construct a Class I bike lane along the Quezon Memorial Circle in collaboration with the DOTr. A Class I bike lane is a designated protected path separate from a motor vehicle roadway. An existing example of a Class I bike lane in the Philippines is located along the Iloilo Diversion Road.

The Quezon Memorial Circle is set to have an elevated 3-meter bike lane made of red asphalt, planting strips, and another lane for pedestrians.

The push to prioritize active mobility relies on a clear vision and political will, said Kimpo.

“Of course, it also follows that the city takes very seriously its commitments vis-à-vis climate change.”

To a certain extent, political will could prevail over funding issues.

“There’s money,” said Kimpo. “Government will always have resources for these things. It’s really just a matter of channeling it towards the right investments that need to be done.” – Rappler.com

Improving active transportation facilities and policies is part of the call of various groups to #MakeManilaLiveable. On Rappler, we have created a dedicated space for stories and reports about liveability in Philippine cities. Learn more about the movement here.

The deepfake video manipulated a November 2022 interview of Ressa by American talk show host Stephen Colbert in his show. 

It was circulated using a newly created Facebook page and an ad on Microsoft’s Bing platform. Microsoft and Facebook have since taken down the post and the ad that circulated the deepfake.

Using digital fingerprints left by the fakers, a follow-up investigation where Rappler collaborated with Swedish digital forensic group Qurium linked the deepfake to a Russian scam network. The investigation also indicated that the campaign specifically targeted Philippine audiences.

Spotting the deepfake

The deepfake video was initially spotted on January 25, 2024, on the Facebook page, “Method Business,” which was created just a few days before. 

Twenty-one hours after the video was posted, it had already garnered 22,000 views. (See screenshot below.)

Rappler was also later alerted to a webpage, hosted under URL ultimainv.website, which alternately cloned the story pages from the websites of Rappler and CNN Philippines. The impostor site was promoted through an ad served on Microsoft’s Bing platform. (Ad encircled by Rappler in the screenshot below)

Ultimainv.website is a newly registered domain. The first record on its domain history is dated January 10, 2024.

The creators of the deepfake video manipulated a November 2022 interview by Colbert where he asked Ressa questions about her book, How To Stand Up To A Dictator, and the cases filed against her and Rappler upon the instigation of former Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte. 

The manipulated video used a fake voice, generated by AI, which mimicked Ressa’s voice. Most of the time, the fake video showed her speaking in sync with the audio. But there were a number of times that the syncing failed, which was the strongest indication that it was a deepfake video. Watch the video embedded below which compares the original interview with the manipulated video that had the AI-generated audio.

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The video may look convincing to a user who isn’t paying attention or isn’t aware of how AI technology can copy voices or how a deepfake video might look. Rappler reported the video to Meta, and it has since been removed, but the page, Method Business, remains active.

More than an effort to scam people into investing in bitcoin, the fake articles published on webpages mimicking Rappler and CNN Philippines also implied that Ressa was involved in the scam.

Both headlined, “Maria Ressa could be sued for her remarks on live TV,” the fake CNN Philippines and Rappler articles both claimed that Ressa’s career “hangs in balance” supposedly following remarks she made on live TV. The ad which promoted the impostor websites used the text: “The end for her?” as lead, implying that Ressa was embroiled in a scandal.

The fake articles also claimed that the live broadcast was supposedly interrupted following demands by leading banks to stop it and erase the recording. (See screenshots of fake articles below.)

Russian origin, targeting a Philippine audience

The pages where the video and the fake Rappler and CNN Philippines articles were posted were also engineered to be viewed only through Philippine internet service providers (ISPs). Investigators who looked into the deepfake had to employ various techniques to view the impostor sites from their location. This implies that those behind the deepfake were specifically targeting Filipinos.

CNN Philippines’ website had already shut down on February 1, 2024, days before the February 5, 2024 publication date of the fake article.

A follow-up investigation with Swedish digital forensic group Qurium Media discovered later that the clone sites were part of a fraudulent online network that tricks victims into paying for a product that usually ends up as an empty box or a random low quality object when delivered.

The network, according to Qurium, appears to be of Russian origin.

Links found in the network also showed the use of Cyrillic script, and a timezone time stamp of GMT+3 (Moscow, St. Petersburg), which, Qurium said, is “solid indication” but “not conclusive proof” that the network is of Russian origin.

The content on the platform used to set up the fake websites is in Russian language.

Qurium analyzed domain registration and hosting information data of the fake sites, metadata from images and the embedded video on the fake sites, and metadata from the original articles scraped from the original CNN and Rappler websites to create the fake pages.

The campaign was in operation from November 28, 2023 to February 25, 2024.

Qurium’s analysis of the network shows an elaborate scheme that skirts legal accountability by dividing the operation into separate entities, allowing for deniability and anonymity.

The scam network, as discovered by Qurium, uses a multi-role scheme that ensures no one will be held accountable for the scam. These are the roles:

• The affiliate advertiser or the publisher

This is the webpage, collecting the names and phone numbers of potential victims to an intermediary, which, in this case, is the “M1 Shop.” Qurium said that on their site, “they make clear that they just advertise goods and they are not responsible for anything related to the merchandise.”

The affiliate advertiser in this case was identified as “TD Globus Contract.” Aside from ultimainv.website, which hosted the fake CNN and Rappler pages, TD Globus Contract was found to have links to more than 40 other websites with ties to the scam network.

• The intermediary

The intermediary (M1 Shop) takes the victims’ info from the publisher, and forwards it to the advertiser for a fee. They are responsible for paying the publisher for the information they receive or the clicks the publisher’s webpage generates that send victims to the M1 Shop.

• Advertisers

Advertisers create the fraud offerings, which, in this case, have ranged from nutrition goods to cryptocurrency offers.

Qurium explained that the fraud works as the advertisers’ identities are protected by the intermediary, while publishers or webpages are changed “once their reputation has been compromised.”

“Ultimately none takes responsibility for the fraud,” Qurium said. “The websites that promote the products are registered under fake companies, and claim that they do not know the final product vendors, and the advertisement network claims that they do not monitor what is promoted in their platform. Something is guaranteed though, victims get scammed and everyone in their network gets paid for their ‘services.'”

Meanwhile, M1 is playing a “brokering role” in the scam network, hiding the malicious advertisers from scrutiny.

Rappler has already reached out to M1 shop via the Telegram accounts on its website. We will update this story when we receive a response from M1.

Potential harm 

Deepfake videos can be convincing and powerfully persuasive, which is why scammers would attempt to use it.

However, there are other potential motivations. In India, politicians have used deepfakes to malign opponents or confuse the electorate. In Taiwan, deepfakes and cheap fakes were spread online ahead of the 2024 presidential elections. In Indonesia, deepfakes had been in use, too, in the lead up to their own presidential elections.

The nature of disinformation is not in the outright lie at times. Oftentimes, it could be merely to plant a seed in the minds of audiences that could later be exploited, Qurium added in its report.  

Regardless of the motivation, potentially, deepfakes can be used to sway public opinion, like a very powerful lie, which is especially harmful in situations such as national elections and fast-moving scenarios like situations of violence, for example. 

Must Read

What can the Philippines learn from how AI was used in Indonesia’s 2024 election?

In this specific case, if the intent was to scam people, the scammers may have thought that using a Maria Ressa deepfake could convince some to invest in a product that ultimately doesn’t exist. The fake campaign may have attempted to leverage a journalist’s reputation as an authoritative voice, at her expense.

Other figures of authority can be victimized, too, putting their reputations on the line. While Rappler and Qurium were investigating this specific deepfake, a similar one which involves a Filipino businessman was also circulated through what appears to be the same process. Very recently, deepfakes which used GMA7 Network anchors were used to promote a necklace supposedly coming from the Vatican.

There are other possibilities. What is curious about the Maria Ressa deepfake is that the ads on Bing, which were promoting the impostor CNN Philippines and Rappler sites, did not appear to be promoting a product. They were implying a scandal involving Ressa.

“What’s particularly concerning (about the Ressa deepfake) are the layers of malicious intent behind a single act of digital manipulation and the consequent harms these inflict,” De La Salle University Communications professor Cheryll Soriano told Rappler.

Soriano, who has been doing research on disinformation on platforms like YouTube, was one of those who spotted and alerted Rappler about the deepfake video. She said: “First, it (the deepfake video) attempts to push a scam. Second, it makes the scam appear news-like, pretending as Rappler and CNN Philippines, undermining the credibility of news organizations. Third, it is clearly motivated to discredit Maria Ressa by maligning her reputation.”

Soriano added that the deepfake also “perpetuates a disturbing trend of misogynistic practices, utilizing deep fakes to humiliate women. Even if the scam itself fails, it still exposes and perpetuates the latter three, spreading them across networked publics.”

Addressing the deepfake threat

There is a general consensus about fact check groups and disinformation experts that the deepfake problem will only continue to grow in the future now that generative AI technologies are readily available to ordinary citizens.

This makes nuanced and immediate platform action critical to mitigate their impact.

In various public statements, the platforms used to circulate the Maria Ressa bitcoin deepfake – Facebook and Microsoft – have both been saying they have programs addressing deepfakes.

In a recently released statement, Meta, the owner of Facebook, said it is working with industry partners on common technical standards for identifying AI content, including video and audio. It said it will label images that users post when they detect these industry standard indicators. It also said it has been labeling photorealistic images created using Meta AI since the product was launched.

In an email interview with Rappler, a Microsoft spokesperson said they have closed 520,000 accounts engaging in fraudulent and misleading activity since April 2023, using both automated and manual methods. The company said that they build upon their knowledge base with each incident to help them detect similar ones in the future, and that they have instituted Information Integrity and Misleading Content policies.

The Microsoft spokesperson also said they are investing in technology to detect deepfakes. “AI is also being harnessed to identify deepfakes. Major players like Microsoft are investing heavily in developing technologies to detect these sophisticated forgeries.”

Microsoft is also part of a group of tech companies and news organizations that have been working with Adobe on the Content Integrity Initiative, an effort that promotes the adoption of an open industry standard for content authenticity and provenance.

Challenges to detecting AI-generated fakes

There are, however, challenges to automated detection of AI-generated fakes.

The Microsoft spokesperson said that bad actors employ sophisticated techniques to elude detection.

“AI technology is advancing at an unprecedented pace, leading to the daily emergence of new platforms worldwide that enable the creation of deepfakes. Ideally, companies producing such content would implement watermarking or similar technologies to facilitate easy detection. However, there are challenges: technology capable of removing watermarks already exists,” the spokesperson said.

Most technologies for creating deepfakes are also open-source, referring to software that is made freely available and may be redistributed and modified by anybody. Microsoft says this allows for modification or deletion of the watermarking code, “complicating detection efforts.”

The practice of making the source code of large language models (LLMs) available for anyone to examine, copy, and modify has played a critical role in accelerating the development of generative AI technologies. In fact, even big tech companies released versions of their own LLMs to the public.

In July 2023, Meta released an open source version of Llama, its artificial intelligence model. More recently, Google also released Gemma, the open source version of Gemini, its proprietary AI model.

While open sourcing the language model may help make them more transparent and auditable, some experts note that the biggest threat in unsecured AI systems lies in ease of misuse, making these systems “particularly dangerous in the hands of sophisticated threat actors.”

Preventing AI misuse, holding fakers accountable

Since even the source code of AI models are now accessible to anybody for them to freely modify, having the capability to trace the source of a particular deepfake becomes very important.

As illustrated above, people behind fakes usually leave traces of who they are when they use digital systems. However, much of the data that could trace accountable actors still reside in platforms. “The greatest challenge of disinformation is not the lies, but in the lack of accountability of those that disseminate the fake information,” Qurium said.

The Swedish group also criticized platforms like Meta and others that profit from it, and allow the disinformation to thrive.

The Microsoft spokesperson acknowledged that the use of deepfakes is “a new and emerging threat,” and that platforms need to do more. “We need to do more at Microsoft, and there are roles for all of industry, government, and others.”

The company said that aside from working with law enforcement, and other legal and technical steps, they’ve also recently “helped move forward an industry initiative to combat the use of deepfakes to deceive voters around the world, and we’ve advocated for legislative frameworks to address AI’s misuse.”

Whether these measures are enough to address the avalanche of deepfakes, that those fighting disinformation are expecting to deal with more and more in the coming months, remains to be seen.

Days after Microsoft took down the ad promoting ultimainv.website, a new ad popped up again on the platform. The ad linked to a site with the same content as the previously mentioned Rappler impostor site, but on another newly-created domain.

The game of whack-a-mole continues. – Rappler.com

Help us spot suspected deepfakes by emailing dubious content you find on social media to factcheck@rappler.com

This special report was produced with support from Internews

Heavy rainfall triggered multiple, fatal landslides that buried 11 children, and destroyed at least 100 houses. 

But this wouldn’t have happened, community sources said, if they weren’t forced to leave their shoreline homes two years earlier to pave the way for private resorts. One of the resorts is owned by a political family. 

Watch the documentary here. – Rappler.com

Researchers and writers: Raizza Bello and Laurice Angeles
Content editors: Chay Hofileña, Jee Geronimo, Herbie Gomez, Inday Varona
Creative director: Emil Mercado
Illustrator: Marian Hukom
Animator: David Castuciano
Graphic artist: Nico Villarete
Voice overs: Jeff Digma and Franz Lopez
Master video editor: Emerald Hidalgo
Supervising producer: Beth Frondoso

This reporting project was supported by the International Women’s Media Foundation’s Howard G. Buffett Fund for Women Journalists.

This story was produced by The Outlaw Ocean Project, a nonprofit journalism organization in Washington, D.C. Reporting and writing was contributed by Ian Urbina, Daniel Murphy, Joe Galvin, Maya Martin, Susan Ryan, Austin Brush.

During the past four years, a team of reporters from The Outlaw Ocean Project conducted a broad investigation of working conditions, human-rights abuses, and environmental crimes in the world’s seafood supply chain. Because the Chinese distant-water fishing fleet is so large, so widely dispersed, and so notoriously brutal, the investigation centered on this fleet. The reporters interviewed captains and boarded ships in the South Pacific Ocean, near the Galapagos Islands; in the South Atlantic Ocean, near the Falkland Islands; in the Atlantic Ocean, near Gambia; and in the Sea of Japan, near Korea. 

China’s dominance has come at a moment when the world’s hunger for products from the sea has never been greater. Seafood is the world’s last major source of wild protein and an existentially important form of sustenance for much of the planet. During the past 50 years, global seafood consumption has risen more than fivefold, and the industry, led by China, has satisfied that appetite through technological advances in refrigeration, engine efficiency, hull strength, and radar. Satellite navigation has also revolutionized how long fishing vessels can stay at sea, and the distances they travel. 

Industrial fishing has now advanced technologically so much that it has become less an art than a science, more a harvest than a hunt. To compete requires knowledge and huge reserves of capital, which Japan and European countries have in recent decades been unable to provide. But China has had both, along with a fierce will to compete and win.

China has grown the size of its fleet predominantly through state subsidies, which by 2018 had reached $7 billion annually, making it the world’s largest provider of fishing subsidies. The vast majority of that investment went toward expenses such as fuel and the cost of new boats. Ocean researchers consider these subsidies harmful, because they expand the size or efficiency of fishing fleets, which further deplete already diminished fish stocks. 

The Chinese government’s support of its fleet is vital. Enric Sala, the director of National Geographic’s Pristine Seas project, said that more than half of the fishing that occurs on the high seas globally would be unprofitable without these subsidies, and squid jigging is the least profitable of all types of high-seas fishing. 

China also bolsters its fleet with logistical, security, and intelligence support. For example, China sends its squid-fishing vessels a weekly digital index that provides updates on the size and location of the world’s major squid colonies. This helps them decide when and where to chase their catch, and often means that they work in a coordinated manner. 

In July of 2022, a reporter from The Outlaw Ocean Project shadowed a group of about 260 Chinese squid ships that were jigging a patch of sea 340 miles west of the Galapagos Islands. At one point during the trip, the reporter watched as the bulk of the fleet suddenly pulled up anchors, in near simultaneity, and moved together to a location roughly 115 miles to the southeast. “This kind of coordination is atypical,” Ted Schmitt, the director of Skylight, an maritime-monitoring program, told me. “Fishing vessels from most other countries wouldn’t work together on this scale.” 

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The visits to Chinese distant-water fishing ships revealed in stark detail a broad pattern of human rights and labor abuses, including debt bondage, wage withholding, excessive working hours, beatings of deckhands, passport confiscation, prohibiting timely access to medical care, and deaths from violence. Workdays on many Chinese open-water fishing vessels routinely last 15 hours, six days a week. Crew quarters are cramped. Injuries, malnutrition, illness, and beatings are common – as is beriberi, which was one of the first signs of problems that the reporters observed during many encounters.

A trip, facilitated in February 2022 by Sea Shepherd, an ocean-conservation group, included an invitation to board a Chinese squid-fishing ship that was fishing in the Blue Hole, an immensely productive high-seas squid fishery in the South Atlantic, near the Falklands. The captain of the vessel granted reporters permission to roam freely as long as they did not name him or his vessel. 

Whenever squid ships are fishing, the heaviest labor happens at night. The ships are festooned with hundreds of bowling-ball-sized light bulbs, which hang on racks on both sides of the vessel and are used to lure squid up from the depths. 

As squid are hauled in, the scene on deck often looks like a brightly lit auto-body shop where an oil change has gone terribly wrong. When pulled onboard, squid squirt purplish black ink. Warm and viscous, the ink coagulates within minutes and coats all surfaces with a slippery mucus-like ooze. Because deep-sea squid have high levels of ammonia in their tissue, for buoyancy, the air on board smells powerfully like urine. 

The mood on board felt like that of a watery purgatory. The ship had about 50 “jigs” hanging off each side, each operated by an automatic reel. Crew members stationed around the deck were responsible for monitoring two or three reels at a time, to ensure that they didn’t jam. The men’s teeth were yellowed from chain smoking, their skin a sickly sallow, their hands torn and spongy from sharp gear and perpetual wetness. Most wore thousand-mile stares as they babysat their equipment, their expressions recalling a quote from the Scythian philosopher Anacharsis, who famously divided people into three categories: the living, the dead, and those at sea. 

Two Chinese deckhands wearing bright orange life vests stood on deck babysitting the automatic reels. One man was 28, the other 18. It was their first time at sea, and they had signed two-year contracts. They earned about $10,000 a year, but, if they missed a day of work for sickness or injury, they were docked three days’ pay. The older deckhand recounted watching a crew member’s arm get broken by a weight from the jig that swung wildly. The captain stayed on the bridge, but another officer shadowed one of the reporters wherever he went. At one point, the officer was called away, and the older deckhand said to the reporter that he was being held there against his will. “It’s impossible to be happy,” he said. “We care about nothing because we don’t want to be here, but we are forced to stay.” He estimated that 80 percent of the other men would also leave if they were allowed. “It’s like being isolated from the world and far from modern life.”

Looking nervous, the younger deckhand ducked into a dark hallway to whisper his plea for help. “Our passports were taken,” he said to the visiting reporter. “They won’t give them back.” 

Instead of speaking more, he then began typing on his cell phone, for fear of being overheard. “Can you take us to the embassy in Argentina?”

A minder who kept watch on the men was temporarily called away, which allowed the deckhands to continue their exchange with the visiting reporter. “I can’t disclose too much right now given I still need to work on the vessel if I give too much information it might potentially create issues onboard,” the 18-year-old wrote on his cell phone. “Please contact my family,” he said, before abruptly ending the conversation when the minder returned. 

Stories of deckhands held captive on these vessels continue to surface: More recently, in June 2023, a bottle washed on shore a beach near Maldonado, Uruguay, with a message inside from a distressed deckhand on another Chinese squidder: “Hello, I am a crew member of the ship Lu Qing Yuan Yu 765, and I was locked up by the company. When you see this paper, please help me call the police! S.O.S. S.O.S.” (The owner of the ship, Qingdao Songhai Fishery,  said that the claims were fabricated by crewmembers.)

In another case, a young Indonesian working roughly 285 miles off the coast of Peru on a Chinese squid ship called the Wei Yu 18 begged the foreman to send him back to shore for medical care. The foreman refused, instead giving him the equivalent of ibuprofen and explaining that his contract had not ended. The man, who died, was part of a breakout of beriberi that sickened five other Indonesians, though the rest of the men received care and survived. 

In interviews, three Indonesian deckhands that worked on the Wei Yu 18 said they had not worked on the high seas before nor did they realize the risks in taking work through manning agencies. Under the definition set by the UN International Labor Organization, forced labor exists when two criteria are met: involuntary work and coercion. Multiple examples of these criteria were found on the Wei Yu 18, according to a confidential investigation of the ship produced in July 2020 by C4ADS, a security research firm. 

“The Indonesian fishermen reportedly asked to leave after one year on the vessel, but they were not allowed to leave,” said the report, which cited additional factors, including beatings, unsanitary food and living conditions, and debt bondage, and concluded that there was clear evidence of forced labor on the ship.

Victor Weedn, a forensic pathologist formerly with the Washington, DC, Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, said that allowing sailors to die from beriberi likely constitutes criminal neglect, since the disease is so easily prevented through proper nutrition or vitamin pills, and since its symptoms can be quickly reversed with proper care. Medical studies show that when B1 is administered intravenously, patients typically recover within 24 hours. Given that, Weedn said, allowing victims to suffer and die over the course of weeks is unconscionable. “Slow-motion murder,” he said, “is still murder.” – Rappler.com

This story was produced by The Outlaw Ocean Project, a nonprofit journalism organization in Washington, D.C. Reporting and writing was contributed by Ian Urbina, Daniel Murphy, Joe Galvin, Maya Martin, Susan Ryan, Austin Brush.

In 2020, several Filipino crew members in a Chinese fishing ship pleaded for their lives in a video. “Please rescue us,” one said. “We are already sick here. The captain won’t send us to the hospital.”

They said that they were sick, but were being prevented from leaving the ship. Three deckhands on the ship died that summer; two of the bodies were put in the freezer, and one was thrown overboard. (The manning agency that placed these workers on the ship, PT Puncak Jaya Samudra, did not respond to requests for comment.)

A four-year investigation from The Outlaw Ocean Project of the Chinese distant-water squid fleet found that, between 2013 and 2021, at least two dozen workers on 14 ships suffered similar symptoms associated with beriberi, a disease caused by a deficiency of vitamin B1. Of those, at least 15 died.

This investigation has also shown that workers are often held captive in inhumane conditions on Chinese fishing ships. Most of the crew aboard comprise migrant workers from Indonesia and the Philippines, making them especially susceptible to forced labor. 

In taking the job on a Chinese fishing ship, the Filipino deckhands had stepped into what may be the largest maritime operation the world has ever known. Fueled by the world’s growing and insatiable appetite for seafood, China has dramatically expanded its reach across the high seas with a distant-water fleet of as many as 6,500 ships, which is more than double its closest global competitor. China also now owns or runs terminals in more than 90 ports around the world and has bought political loyalties, particularly in coastal countries in South America and Western Africa. It has become the world’s undisputed seafood superpower.

But China’s preeminence on the water has come at a high human and environmental cost. Fishing is ranked as the deadliest job in the world and, by many measures, Chinese squid ships are among the most brutal. Debt bondage, human trafficking, violence, criminal neglect, preventable injuries, and death are common in this fleet. When the Environmental Justice Foundation interviewed 116 Indonesian crew members who had worked between September 2020 and August 2021 on Chinese distant-water vessels, roughly 97 percent of them reported having experienced some form of debt bondage or confiscation of guaranteed money and documents, and 58 percent reported having seen or experienced physical violence. 

The fleet is also ranked as the largest purveyor of illegal fishing in the world. A 2022 review of illegal fishing incidents that occurred between 1980 and 2019, commissioned by the European Parliament, found that nearly half of the cases where the vessel type was identified were committed by Chinese squid ships.

Compared to other countries, China has been not only less responsive to international regulations and media pressure when it comes to labor rights or ocean preservation, but also less transparent about its fishing boats and processing factories, said Sally Yozell, the director of the Environmental Security Program at the Stimson Center, a research organization in Washington, D.C.

Since the overwhelming majority of seafood consumed in the US and EU is caught by Chinese ships or processed in China, she said, it is especially difficult for companies to know whether the products they sell are tainted by illegal fishing or human rights abuses. 

When this seafood reaches land, it often goes through processing plants in China using Uyghur labor. In the past decade, the Chinese government has been forcibly relocating tens of thousands of Uyghur workers, loading them onto trains, planes and buses under tight security, and sending them to seafood processing plants on the other side of the country in Shandong province, a fishing hub along the eastern coast.

In 2022, the UN said that Chinese government documents indicated coercion was used to place Uyghur “surplus laborers” in transfer programs. In the same year, the International Labor Organization expressed “deep concern” over China’s labor policies in Xinjiang, noting that coercion was built-in to the regulatory and policy framework for labor transfers. 

By searching company newsletters, annual reports, and state media stories, the investigation found that in the past five years, more than a thousand Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities have been sent to work in at least 10 seafood processing plants. 

The Chinese government also bolsters its seafood industry with workers from North Korea, primarily in processing plants in the border province of Liaoning, located in northeast China. The North Korean government has, for the past 30 years, sent citizens to work in factories in Russia and China, and to put 90 percent of their earnings – amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars per year – into accounts controlled by the government.

As of November 2022, more than 80,000 North Koreans were employed in Chinese border cities, including hundreds in seafood plants. Videos from the Chinese social media app Douyin show North Korean female workers in seafood factories as recently as November 2022 in Dandong and Donggang.

Play Video

Most deckhands around the world get their jobs through so-called manning agencies. Hundreds of these firms operate globally, playing a vital role in supplying crew members from dozens of countries to ships that are almost always on the move. The firms handle everything from paychecks and plane tickets to port fees and passports. For the men they recruit, these firms promise an open doorway to another, more lucrative life. 

They end up signing contracts that stipulate there would be no overtime, no sick leave, 18- to 24-hour workdays, seven-day workweeks, and a $50 monthly food deduction. If the fishing vessel was not near a convenient port of repatriation, the contracts permitted captains to extend their stay on board indefinitely. Captains were also granted full discretion over reassigning crew members to alternate ships. Wages were to be paid not monthly to families but in full only after completion of the contract, a practice that is illegal in most countries. 

Their contracts could require that they pay a processing fee for recruitment, which was to be deducted from their salary. Since the men did not have the money to pay the upfront fees for access to the job, they were required to give the agency their diplomas and family cards as a form of collateral, which were to be returned to the men’s families once the fees were deducted from the men’s salaries. Having initially been told by recruiters that they would make upwards of $450 per month, the men soon learned that the actual salary would be far less, typically around $300.

This is also when the men learned about a range of salary deductions. These deductions would have been loosely explained amid a flurry of paperwork, rapid-fire calculations, and unfamiliar terms: “passport forfeiture,” “mandatory fees,” “sideline earnings.” The deckhands’ contracts also included penalty clauses, which said that they would pay up to $1,000 if they left the ship before their contracts expired. 

Working 12- to 24-hour shifts, the men typically slept during the day, since squid fishing occurs best at night, with help from extremely bright light bulbs that lure the creatures toward the surface. On the ship, the men slept four to a room in wooden bunk beds, each with one blanket on soggy foam mattresses made wet by walls that sweated with condensation. 

Violence is common. Deckhands have described captains hitting them on the head; kicking and slapping them, usually for not understanding instructions given in Chinese; taking too long to untangle fishing lines; or dropping squid on the deck. 

The Chinese have established a remarkable presence on the world’s oceans during the past several decades. The effort began in 1985, when the China National Fisheries Corporation (CNFC) dispatched 13 trawlers carrying a crew of 223 men to work the coast of Guinea-Bissau, in West Africa.

Today, CNFC, which is state-run, is the largest distant-water fishing company in the world. CNFC forms the connective tissue for much of the industry, including many of the worst scofflaw ships. It owns over 250 fishing boats and refuel ships, at least six seafood processing plants or cold storage warehouses, and more than 15 refrigeration vessels, or reefers, that carry the catch back to shore. 

For most of the 20th century, distant-water fishing was dominated by three countries: the Soviet Union, Japan, and Spain. These fleets shrank in size after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, and as rising labor and environmental standards made it costlier for Japan and European countries to compete in the international seafood market.

But during this period, China invested billions of dollars in its fleet and took advantage of new technologies to muscle in on a very lucrative industry. China has also attempted to fortify its autonomy by building its own processing plants, cold-storage facilities and fishing ports overseas.

Those efforts succeeded beyond any predictions. China has now become the world’s undisputed seafood superpower. In 1988 it caught 198 million pounds of seafood; in 2020, it caught 5 billion. No other country even comes close. 

For China, the vast armada has great value that extends beyond just maintaining its status as a seafood superpower. It also helps the country create jobs, make money, and feed its growing middle class. Abroad, the fleet also helps the country forge new trade routes, flex political muscle, press territorial claims, and increase China’s political influence in the developing world. 

Political analysts, particularly in the West, say that having just one country controlling a global resource as valuable as seafood creates a precarious power imbalance. Navy analysts and ocean conservationists also fear that China is expanding its maritime reach in ways that are undermining global food security, eroding international law, and heightening military tensions. 

“Plenty of countries are engaging in destructive fishing practices but China is distinct because of the size of its fleet and because it uses the fleet for geopolitical ambitions,” said Ian Ralby, CEO of I.R. Consilium, a global consultancy that concentrates on maritime security. “No one else has the same level of state ownership in this industry, no one else has a law that obligates their fishing ships to actively gather and hand over intelligence to the government and no one else is as actively invading other countries’ waters.”

Ralby said that through its distant-water fishing fleet, China is working to establish de facto sovereignty over international waters, by leaning on a terrestrial legal concept called “adverse possession,” which, in essence, grants property rights to anyone who occupies and controls an area long enough. The recent signing by 193 countries of a high-seas biodiversity treaty, which aims at eventually protecting 30 percent of the world’s oceans, is unlikely to change China’s course.

“China likely believes that, in time, the presence of its distant water fishing fleet on the high seas will convert into some degree of sovereign control over those waters and the resources in them,” Ralby said. “With 70 percent of the earth covered in water, any one state’s effort to establish rights and interests over the global commons should be a concern.”

According to Greg Poling, a senior fellow at Center for Strategic and International Studies, there’s another wrinkle in all of this: Not all Chinese fishing vessels actually fish. Instead, hundreds of them serve as a kind of civilian militia that works to press territorial claims against other nations. Many of those claims concern seafloor oil and gas reserves. Taking ownership of the South China Sea, for example, Poling said, is part of the same historical project for the Chinese as taking control of Hong Kong and Taiwan. The goal is to reclaim “lost” territory and restore China’s former glory. 

Sometimes, these boats are called into action. In December 2018, the Philippine government announced that it planned to repair an airstrip and build a re-supply pier on Thitu Island, a piece of land contested between the Philippines and China. More than ninety Chinese fishing vessels amassed along its coast, making it unsafe for Filipino ships to approach and delaying renovations.

In 2019, a Chinese fishing vessel rammed and sank a Filipino ship anchored at Reed Bank, a disputed region in the South China Sea that is rich in oil and natural gas reserves. (The Chinese government declined to comment on these matters. But Mao Ning, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has previously argued that her government had a right to “safeguarded China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime order.”) To be concluded – Rappler.com

NEXT: Part 2 | A superpower of seafood, China, sometimes uses forced labor

On Thursday, December 21, GIJN included in its list Rappler’s Diplomatic Immunity and Impunity series, as well as an investigative piece on pro-China disinformation operations in the Philippines.

The Diplomatic Immunity and Impunity series is a data-driven, cross-border investigation uncovering how erring diplomats have been able to exploit their migrant domestic workers and have gotten away with it for decades, owing to a privilege called diplomatic immunity.

Because of this privilege, it is difficult for workers to seek legal remedies. And even when the diplomats were charged and courts ruled in favor of the workers, nongovernmental organizations have noted that enforcing judgments remained difficult.

With most of the exploited domestic workers uncovered as women from developing countries, Rappler further explored what happens after rescue. Years after escaping, justice was still elusive for the workers – especially for one who had over €80,000 in stolen and unpaid wages.

The four-part series was written by journalist Ana P. Santos, Rappler multimedia reporter Michelle Abad, and Rappler digital forensics specialist Pauline Macaraeg. 

Journalismfund Europe and the Pulitzer Center supported the reporting for the series.

Diplomatic immunity and impunity – a Rappler series

Macaraeg also wrote the other recognized piece, “How pro-China propaganda is seeded online in the Philippines.” The in-depth report explored how pro-China sentiments were spread online in the wake of Chinese Coast Guard aggression against Philippine ships in the West Philippine Sea.

The investigation stems from the August 5 incident of the Chinese Coast Guard blasting its water cannons at two Philippine ships in a resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre stationed at Ayungin Shoal. 

Nationalist comments may be expected from Filipinos following such an incident, but instead, there was rampant criticism of the Philippine Coast Guard’s condemnation of the harassment, and the championing of Beijing.

The investigation discovered that a pro-China community on Facebook has been spreading propaganda and disinformation to support China for years, and it was formed during the administration of former president Rodrigo Duterte.

How pro-China propaganda is seeded online in the Philippines

Other stories the GIJN recognized from Southeast Asia include pieces on the procurement and use of espionage tools in Indonesia, how illegal timber in Cambodia is used to sustain top fashion brands, and cyber attacks launched by the Burmese military junta against female pro-democracy activists, among others.

“The stories featured reveal the commitment and tenacity of journalists to continue exposing crime and wrongdoing, often thanks to the use of digital investigative tools,” the GIJN said. – Rappler.com

Rappler has verified with various sources that Duterte’s guns were all approved by the national police for licensing in June 2022, with an expiration in March 2032. The Philippine National Police (PNP), via its Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO), is the country’s issuer of gun licenses and the main regulator.

In a media briefing on Tuesday, January 30, 2024, Duterte said he was aware of the probe into his firearms after receiving a call from the FEO. The former president explained that he is a gun enthusiast, adding that all his firearms have licenses. 

“So lahat no’ng baril ko, pati ‘yong maliit na baril, lisensiyado ‘yan. Kaya ang kinuha ko para makaano ako, kasi mahilig ako sa baril, pinarehistro ko lahat na sa Crame. Kaya sila tanong-tanong, marami kang baril, eh putang-ina tingnan mo sa Crame,” Duterte said. 

(So all my guns, including the small ones, were all registered. I am a gun collector so I have them all registered in Camp Crame. Some people have a lot of questions why I have many guns, son of a whore, check the licenses in Crame.)

Duterte added that some of his foreign visitors gave him guns during their visits. “Pati ‘yong mga puti na gustong makipagbisita sa ’kin dito, magdala ng baril, may papeles, ibigay ko kay Bong [Go], irehistro niya. So wala akong putang… wala akong baril sa bahay na hindi rehistrado. Sabi nila 500, si Bong nag-register, ‘di ko naman alam, ‘di ko man lang nahawakan ‘yong iba.” 

(Even those Westerners who visited me, brought guns with licenses. I gave those to Bong, and he registered them. So I don’t have any unregistered guns in my house. They say I have 500 guns. Bong was the one who registered for me, so I don’t know, I was not even able to hold some of those guns.)

The former president also said that his guns were considered collector’s items allowed by the law. 

“Collector’s item lang ‘yan, it’s allowed by law. How can you use it against me when the practice of giving a collector’s license is allowed by law? Paano mo gamitin ‘yan, batas ‘yan eh,” Duterte said. “Doon ako napika eh. Alam ko eh, may tawag ‘yong pulis sa akin sa Crame, ‘sir, chine-check.’ Sabi ko, ‘Ibigay mo lahat, buksan mo.’”

(Those guns are collector’s items allowed by law. How can you use it against me when the practice of giving a collector’s license is allowed by law? It’s the law so how can you use that against me? That’s what angered me. I am aware of the probe because of a call from police in Crame who said, “Sir, they’re checking your guns.” I said, “Give everything, open it.”)

Rappler obtained copies of FEO certifications, which we have verified. The documents say information on the licensed guns “exist in the FEO records.”

Asked for comment on their licensing of at least 358 guns for one individual such as Duterte, the PNP FEO – citing data privacy – told Rappler in a message on Thursday, December 7, “We cannot provide you the exact figures on this.”

“We can say [that] as long as a qualified individual possesses a Type 5 LTOPF (Licence to Own and Possess Firearm), and [is] a gun collector, he/she may possess more than 15 guns/firearms,” said the PNP FEO.

Being a gun collector is not a prerequisite certification to get a Type 5 license. One has to submit the usual requirements (drug test, psychological test, etc.) plus have a vault at home that the PNP-FEO should check and determine to be sufficient for the gun collection. Compliance with these requirements can facilitate obtaining a Type 5 license, which automatically makes the license holder a gun collector.

Duterte holds a Type 5 license, and under the law, a Type 5 license specifically allows “certified gun collectors” to have more than 15 guns.

More than half of the licensed firearms – at least 222 – are pistols, the documents showed. Duterte has an AK-47 pistol. Among his collection of 73 rifles is an AK-47. This is noted because AK-47s, branded as “weapons of choice” by extremist groups, are among assault weapons that some American states seek to ban to address persisting gun violence in the US.

According to the documents, Duterte also has in his stash the Israeli-made high-powered rifle Galil, an assault rifle said to match the Russian AK-47.

While current laws do not impose a limit on how many guns a certified gun collector may own, there is a laxity of regulations that can be abused, said Carlos Zarate, a gun control advocate, both in his capacity as former lawmaker and human rights lawyer.

It also raises concerns about possible implications on peace and order in a country where there has been extensive gun violence, usually from private armies. Duterte is tagged in the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) investigation into the alleged Davao Death Squad, and the government’s campaign against drugs, where tens of thousands were killed with guns.

The United States once paused the sale of assault rifles to the Philippines in November 2016 over heightened concerns over the drug war killings.

We tried to get Duterte’s side and reached out on December 7 to his former spokesperson Harry Roque, his former aide and now Senator Bong Go, his former executive secretary Salvador Medialdea, and Medialdea’s firm which recently appeared for him in a preliminary investigation in the grave threat complaint filed against the former president by Act Teachers Party-list Representative France Castro.

Roque told Rappler, “I am no longer his spokesperson” and deferred to Go. Go’s staff told Rappler to try Medialdea. We again reached out to Medialdea morning of Friday, December 8, and though he had seen the message, has not responded as of writing. Neither has his firm, which we emailed through the two lawyers who appeared for Duterte in the Castro complaint. We called Medialdea on Saturday, December 9, but he did not pick up. We will update this story once we get a reply from the Duterte camp.

What are those guns for?

Those who know him have described Duterte as a gun enthusiast. His former defense secretary, Delfin Lorenzana, said in 2017 that Duterte has been carrying a gun since the ’90s. In January 2022, Duterte said he has 10 guns. “All of them have a license, I got licenses for them,” said Duterte in Filipino during a speech where he railed against armed communist rebels.

However, through the years as a public official, Duterte has not specifically listed any firearm as property in his Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALNs), according to the copies Rappler has on file for 1998-2000, 2002-2009, 2012-2014, and 2016-2017.

At least 72 of the 222 pistols with brands and models identified and registered under Duterte already have an estimated value of P5.5 million, based on latest available retail prices of leading firearm sellers in the Philippines. Including other guns – based on the cheapest models of rifles, revolvers, and shotguns, among others – a conservative estimate of Duterte’s stash ranges from P5.5 million to P7 million.

Duterte’s last known worth net worth was P28.5 million, according to his 2017 SALN.

Duterte’s SALNs from 2018 until he stepped down from the presidency have been kept secret from the public, backed by a supplemental policy from the Office of the Ombudsman which, until Duterte’s time, was the office that released SALNs of presidents every year.

A favored law

Duterte would not have had 10-year licenses had he not enacted a law on May 6, 2022, or a month before turning over the presidency. He passed Republic Act 11766, which amended two sections of the Noynoy Aquino-time RA 10591. These sections would later turn out to be beneficial to Duterte when he registered the 358 firearms.

Duterte’s RA 11766 extended the validity of firearm licenses to 5-10 years, meaning a license to own can be valid for that period, and registration can be renewed after every 10 years. In RA 10591, license to own was valid for only two years, and registration could be renewed only every four years. 

License to own is an authority to buy a firearm, required to be seen by the seller; whereas registration is the document accompanying the firearm already in the possession of the owner.

The law requires that people who apply for a license to carry outside their house or workplace must prove that there is an imminent danger to their lives. 

Under RA 10591, eight professions were automatically considered to face imminent danger, therefore making it easier for professionals in these fields to obtain a permit: lawyers, accountants, journalists, cashiers/bank tellers, religious leaders, physicians and nurses, engineers, and businessmen. In Duterte’s new law, he added two more, as if to accommodate himself – elected officials, both past and present, and military and law enforcement personnel, both retired and active. 

Why so many

The law is silent on the maximum number that an individual can own. To Zarate, the number 358 alone is concerning “because will all those guns just be for yourself?”

“Ang 358 firearms ay parang oversized company or an undersized battalion na puwede mong armasan. Kahit sabihin mo na nakalisensya sa kanya personally, puwede niya ipagamit ‘yan. That’s really a ground for concern,” Zarate told Rappler.

(358 arms is like arming an oversized company or an undersized battalion. Even if you say that’s your personal license, you can lend it to others.)

The PNP-FEO said a license is non-transferable. The FEO also told Rappler that former presidents don’t have special privileges in terms of gun licensing, adding that anyone can avail of licenses to own and possess firearms, as well as obtain firearm registrations.

“Even though it is subjective what is necessary to protect you, but grabe ang 300+ (it is excessive). As a former president, you already have PSG (Presidential Security Group), what will prevent other people from asking the same kind of privilege?” Zarate told Rappler.

As early as 2010, the Philippine government through the ad-hoc Independent Commission Against Private Armies (ICAPA) had recommended putting a cap on the quantity and calibre of firearms that an individual can possess. The legal basis for the no-limit possession is Executive Order No. 194 of year 2000, which the ICAPA wanted expressly repealed. But it never was, neither through Aquino, also a known gun enthusiast, nor Duterte. 

The ICAPA also recommended the passage of an anti-private armies law that would have decentralized the authority from the PNP to issue licenses, and instead give the power to an independent commission. ICAPA was formed after the Ampatuan massacre in Maguindanao in 2009, the murder in broad daylight of 58 people. The Ampatuan clan, their private armies, and local police had conspired in the murder.

Duterte’s collection of 358 firearms is about one-fourth of the 1,200 assorted firearms seized from the Ampatuan clan after the massacre. The Ampatuans, however, were known to have had mostly military weapons, the bulk of which their foot soldiers managed to move out before the raids on their mansions, military officers involved in those operations said.

ICAPA’S recommendations “were not translated to legislation,” said Zarate. “In fact if there were amendments, they relaxed the rules more. That is reflective of the composition of Congress, because many of them have armed bodyguards. That is one of the most difficult to pass – gun control laws – because majority of members of Congress are owners of guns,” said Zarate in a mix of English and Filipino.

Zarate said the existing regulations must be stricter. “Ang nangyayari kasi naiikutan talaga regulations nila, kahit mga psychiatric exams, etc., may mga fixers pa rin. Isa ito sa malaking pinagkakakitaan,” he added. 

(What happens is that the regulations are skirted, there are fixers for requirements such as psychiatric exams. This is a source of business.)

Guns in his stash

More than half of Duterte’s firearms – at least 222 – are pistols. A pistol is “a hand-operated firearm having a chamber integral with or permanently aligned with the bore which may be self-loading,” according to Republic Act No. 10591 or the Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act of 2012.

One of the higher priced ones in Duterte’s possession, based on obtained documents, is a 9mm KRISS Vector SDP, worth P261,000. According to the manufacturer’s website, this model of pistol is the “ideal choice for personal protection and home defense.”

At least 72 or 21% of the firearms registered under the name of the former president are rifles. These are “designed to be fired from the shoulder that can discharge a bullet through a rifled barrel by different actions of loading, which may be classified as lever, bolt, or self-loading.”

One of the expensive rifles that Duterte owns is an Agencija Alan Assault Rifle Type VHS K worth P350,000, and a VHS-D worth about the same. Another is a Kalashnikov KR-9, a “civilian legal semi-automatic rifle based on the Russian Vityaz submachine gun” priced at P163,000.

The documents obtained by Rappler also show that Duterte has 45 revolvers, 13 shotguns, 2 small arms, and 1 high-powered rifle.

The total 358 licensed to Duterte do not include 13 firearms registered over a three-year period before his presidency, with the earliest license obtained in March 2011 and the latest in March 2014. These licenses expired between March 2015 and March 2016, or in the one-year period before he was sworn into office. 

The licenses registered under Duterte prior to becoming president included eight rifles and five pistols, estimated to be worth between P900,000 to P1 million in total. – Rappler.com

AT A GLANCE:

• The Romualdez clan’s wealth can be traced back to deals made by their late patriarch, which critics deemed as clear signs of cronyism during the Marcos dictatorship
• House Speaker Martin Romualdez is supporting a measure that will benefit mining companies under his family’s portfolio

MANILA, Philippines – Just how rich is House Speaker Martin Romualdez?

This was a question that was raised early on in his political career when he gained national attention in 2009 for supposedly paying for a lavish dinner at the upscale Le Cirque for former president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and other officials when they were in New York for a working visit to meet then-US president Barack Obama.

News articles said Romualdez allegedly paid $20,000, equivalent to almost P1 million at that time. The timing could not have been more insensitive, given that the nation was mourning the death of former president Corazon Aquino.

Then-press secretary Cerge Remonde confirmed the dinner to columnist Ellen Tordesillas. “Yes, I was there. It was on the invitation of Cong. Martin Romualdez. Malacañang did not pay for it,” Tordesillas said in her blog. In a television interview in 2016, Romualdez denied paying for the dinner.

Back when the House of Representatives was still publishing the net worth of legislators, Romualdez’s wealth was pegged at P474 million, making him the eighth richest congressman in 2015.

One of the few clues about his wealth pointed to his father, the late former ambassador Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez, whose net worth was estimated at over P3.3 billion by Forbes. The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) claimed that his wealth was ill-gotten. 

Journalists got an opportunity to ask Romualdez questions about how he got rich when he ran in the 2016 senatorial elections. He didn’t win a seat after placing 15th in the race.

In an interview with broadcast journalist Karen Davila, Romualdez attributed his wealth to his achievements in the private sector.

“Well, I was a lawyer before I became a congressman, I still am. And I was in the corporate world, I was able to rise up the ranks of some corporate boards. I even ended up becoming the chairman of Equitable Banking Corporation and chairman of Benguet Corporation, the oldest mining corporation in the Philippines. We were behind some of the biggest mergers in the country. We were very lucky and fortunate to make the right investments and decisions then,” Romualdez said in an ANC interview in 2016.

When asked about his late father’s net worth and alleged cronyism, Romualdez did not contest the Forbes estimate, but emphasized that cases against his late father have been dismissed by the courts.

“I guess he had some investments as well. I was much younger then, so I didn’t know his business transactions. But that again, there have been cases, and all of these cases involving the PCGG, I think that most of them have already been dismissed, particularly the anti-graft cases. So, the records speak for themselves and I guess Forbes wouldn’t come up with those figures if they were derived from spurious sources,” Romualdez said.

On paper, Romualdez currently has no stake in Benguet Corporation. His two brothers formerly held the highest posts. Philip was former president and CEO, while Daniel was the company’s former chairman.

Martin’s son, 22-year-old Andrew Julian, currently sits as a director of the board. He graduated in 2022 from Cornell University with a degree in international agriculture and rural development.

Rappler reached out to Romualdez’s media relations staff to confirm his and his family’s ties to Benguet Corporation, as well as other mining-linked companies – Bright Kindle and Marcventures. They have acknowledged our requests and follow-ups made on November 28 and December 1, 4, and 6, but we were told that Romualdez has yet to respond. We will update this story once we get a reply.

Benguet Corporation

Benguet Corporation was established in 1903 as Benguet Consolidated Mining Company (BCMC). It was founded by three Americans that mined for gold: Metcalf Clarke, Nelson Peterson, and Henry Clyde. 

From mining operations in the Baguio-Itogon district, the company expanded and acquired other mining companies. 

By 1965, BCMC, which renamed itself into Benguet Consolidated Incorporated (BCI), was the largest gold producer in the Philippines, accounting for almost half of the total gold production in the country. 

The Romualdez family got into the company during the dictatorship of the late president Ferdinand E. Marcos. At that time, legislation limited foreign ownership of mining companies to just 40%. 

Benjamin Romualdez, brother of Imelda Marcos, got a substantial stake in BCI after Palm Avenue Realty and Development Corporation and Palm Avenue Holdings slowly acquired BCI shares for him, according to the PCGG. 

The anti-graft court Sandiganbayan, however, said in a 2008 ruling that the government failed to “adequately comply” with its order to clarify its allegations that the two Palm companies were conduits to convert public funds to acquire shares. The Sandiganbayan junked the PCGG’s case.

Benguet Corporation currently operates gold mines in Benguet Province, nickel mines in Zambales province, and a limestone production facility in Baguio City.

Its subsidiaries are: 

• Benguet Management Corporation
• Arrow Freight and Construction Corporation
• Benguetrade Incorporated
• Benguetcorp Resources Management Corporation
• Keystone Port Logistics and Management Services Corporation
• Benguetcorp Laboratories Incorporated 
• Benguetcorp International Limited

Currently, Benguet Corporation got the green light from the Mines and Geosciences Bureau for a gold project in Zamboanga Sibugay province. The project is located around 150 kilometers from Zamboanga City.

Bright Kindle and Marcventures

Romualdez has other mining companies, namely, Marcventures, and a holding company called Bright Kindle Resources and Investments Incorporated (BKR).

BKR is a holding company acquired by Romualdez-owned RYM Business Management Corporation in 2013.

Prior to the acquisition, BKR was formerly Bankard Incorporated, a subsidiary of Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation that was involved in the credit card business. But after it was acquired by RYM, it ceased to be in the credit card business and became a holding company.

To date, BKR has no operating segment other than being a holding company. 

BKR was once reported to have been considered for acquisition by casino-hotel firm Okada Manila for purposes of a backdoor listing. Both companies denied the news reports.

BKR has a 100% stake in Bright Star Resources and Development (BHD), a mining company that was created only in 2022 with an authorized capital of P150 million. BKR also holds 19.9% of Marcventures.

BKR has been described by many stock market observers as a somewhat dormant company, up until the Marcos Jr. presidency. Most recently, or in September 2023, its board of directors suddenly approved a property dividend worth around P50 million, where BKR shareholders were entitled to have 1 BHD share for every 3 BKR shares owned. It also declared cash dividends of approximately 12% of the property dividend’s value.

When the dividends were announced, popular stock market newsletter Merkado Barkada quipped, “What took you so long?”

“BKR is the epitome of a crony stock, so I’m morbidly curious to see for what purpose this sleeping dog has been shaken from its slumber,” it added.

Marcventures, formerly AJO.net Holdings Incorporated, was set up in 1957. It changed its name to its present one in 2010, as it changed its business to include land ownership. 

Its subsidiary, Marcventures Mining and Development Corporation (MMDC), holds a mineral production sharing agreement covering 4,799 hectares in Cantilan, Surigao del Sur.

It is involved in extracting, mining, smelting, refining and converting mineral ores like nickel, chromites, copper, gold, manganese and other similar ores.

MMDC’s main product is nickel ore. All its nickel ore productions were exported to China.

In 2017, it merged with Asia Pilot Mining Philippines Corporation and BrightGreen Resources Holdings, with Marcventures as the surviving entity. The merger gave Marcventures the claims to three more mining areas in Samar and Surigao del Sur.

Its other subsidiaries are:

• BrightGreen Resources Corporation
• Alumina Mining Philippines Incorporated
• Bauxite Resources Incorporated

Romualdez’s son, Andrew Julian, sits as a director of the company, too.

Lowering mining taxes

Environmental groups have expressed concern over Romualdez's possible conflict of interest.

The Marcos administration is currently pushing for the rationalization of the mining fiscal regime.

The House of Representatives approved House Bill 8937 or an Act Enhancing the Fiscal Regime for the Mining Industry last September 26. The bill seeks to impose a 4% royalty on the gross output of mining operations within mining reservations – a decline from the current 5%.

Mining reservation areas are sites that the government had identified as economically viable and mineral rich. There are currently nine mining reservation areas in the Philippines.

Despite its speedy passage, the bill was criticized for supposedly reducing taxes for mining companies.

“Akala ko ba the concern of the government was to raise revenue?” Cielo Magno, an economics professor at the University of the Philippines Diliman and a former undersecretary in the Department of Finance, earlier told Rappler in an interview. (I thought the concern of the government was to raise revenue?)

“Why are we lowering taxes for these companies when they’re already paying 5%?”

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Aside from revenue concerns, the mining fiscal regime bill is being proposed in the face of a growing demand for more minerals to supply the needs of countries transitioning to clean technologies.

At present, the government gets 5% royalty from the gross output of companies operating in mining reservations. Those within ancestral domains give 1% of their gross output to the government. Those outside mineral reservation areas do not pay royalties.

Here are the salient features of HB 8937:

• Lowers royalty rate of mining operations within mining reservations from 5% to 4%
• Imposes profit-based royalty for mining operations outside mining reservations; the current fiscal regime does not levy taxes for operations outside mining reservations
• Subjects companies to a windfall profits tax
• Subjects small-scale mining operations with a royalty rate equivalent to one-tenth of 1% of gross minerals output
• Does not impose export tax

“No less than the Chamber of Mines of the Philippines has expressed support for the measure as it went through the legislative process in the House. I agree with the chamber that the fiscal changes being introduced by this bill will help the country’s post-pandemic economic recovery,” Romualdez said when the bill was passed at the House of Representatives. – Rappler.com

FAST FACTS: Media Serbisyo, Martin Romualdez’s joint venture with ABS-CBN